A brief overview on secure control of networked systems
Source abstract
Abstract
This paper focuses on the issues of the security of networked control systems by summarizing recent progress in secure control of this research and application area. We mainly discuss existing results, especially in modeling issues, of three aspects: (1) attack mechanisms and their impacts on control systems, (2) the identification and design of attacks, and (3) secure estimation and control strategies. A conclusion is drawn at the end of this paper. In addition, several promising research tendencies of the development for secure control in networked control system are presented.
Source: openaire · Quality: candidate unverified · Source record ↗
Research context
OpenAlex topics: Smart Grid Security and Resilience · Fault Detection and Control Systems · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
SciVX discovery tags are terminology-based. OpenAlex topics are source-provided classifications.
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